3.7. Pure Thought
There are three issues to consider: coincidences, inflation, and our taste as to how the world might best end.
If m ~ 0.25
we flourish at a special epoch, just as the
universe is making the transition from matter-dominated to
- or curvature-dominated
expansion within the
Friedmann-Lemaître model.
Maybe this is pure chance. Maybe it is an effect of selection:
perhaps galaxies as homes for observers would not have existed if
m were very
different from unity
(Martel et al. 1998
and references therein). Maybe there is no coincidence: perhaps
m really is
close to unity. Most of us consider the last the
most reasonable possibility. But the observational entries in
Table 2
show that
if
m = 1 then
Nature has presented us with a considerable
set of consistently misleading clues. The much more likely reading of
the evidence is that, within the Friedmann-Lemaître model,
m
0.25. We
should pay attention to arguments from aesthetics; the history of
physical science has many examples of the success of ideas driven by
logic and elegance. But there are lots of examples of surprises,
too. The evidence that
m is significantly less than unity is a
surprise. I enter it as a demerit for the Friedmann-Lemaître model,
but not a serious one: surprises happen.
The conventional inflation picture accounts for the near
homogeneity of the observable universe by the postulate that an
epoch of near exponential expansion driven by a large effective
cosmological constant stretched all length scales in the primeval chaos
to unobservably large values, making the universe we can see close to
uniform. The same process would have made the
radius of curvature of space very large. Thus in their book,
The Early Universe,
Kolb & Turner (1988)
emphasize that a sensible inflation theory requires negligibly
small space curvature: m may be less than unity, but
if it is a cosmological constant makes
m +
equal to unity. The argument is sensible but
model-dependent.
Gott (1982)
pioneered a variant of inflation
that produces a near homogeneous Friedmann-Lemaître model with open
space sections.
Ratra & Peebles
(1994)
revived the concept; details of the history and application are in
Górski et
al. (1998).
Most proponents of inflation I have talked to share the
preference for
m +
= 1
but agree that they could learn to live with the open version if that is what
the observations required. The flat low density case does get
the higher grades in Table 2, from
the z-m relation and
the CBR anisotropy, but my impression is that both results are too
preliminary to support a decision on open versus flat space sections.
The values of the cosmological parameters tell us how the world ends
according to the Friedmann-Lemaître model, whether it is collapse
back to a Big Crunch or expansion into the
indefinitely remote future. But why should we pay attention to
an extrapolation into the remote future of a theory
we can be pretty sure is at best only an approximation to reality? For
example, suppose improved tests showed that
m = 0.2, that the
dimensionless measure
of Einstein's cosmological constant is quite small,
|
| << 1, and that space
curvature correspondingly is negative. The straightforward
interpretation would be that our universe is going to expand
forever more, but it need not follow. If
were
constant and less than zero, then no matter how small
|
| the
Friedmann-Lemaître model would predict
that the expansion will
eventually stop and the universe will contract back to a Big
Crunch. (2)
small negative value. This may be of some comfort if the Big Crunch is
more to your taste. To my taste the main lesson is that we should stop
all this talk about how the world ends until we can think of some
scientific meaning to attach to the answer.
2 The example is
contrived but not entirely
frivolous. Standard and successful particle theory includes a
cosmological constant, in
the form of the energy density of the vacuum, but quite fails to
explain why its value is in the observationally acceptable range.
Until we have a deeper theory that deals with this I don't see
how we can exclude the idea that it has or ends up with an exceedingly
small negative value. Back.